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Civil strife and economic and social policies
Joseph E. Stiglitz
The issue of civil strife and economic and social policies is one I becameengaged with while working at the World Bank. It is of tremendousimportance, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The last 50 years have shown
that development is possible, but far from inevitable. Fifty years ago, as many of the
economies in the developing world were becoming independent, there was great hope
for their success. In the half century that has gone by we have seen that one region
in the world, East Asia, has had huge success in terms of per capita income (in
countries like Korea, an eight-fold increase), but in many other parts of the world,
such as sub-Saharan Africa, there has been by and large enormous failure. Incomes
today in much of sub-Saharan Africa are lower than they were 20 or 30 years ago.
Life expectancy, after increasing substantially over a number of years, now has begun
to decline, mainly but not only because of the AIDS epidemic.
Conflict and underdevelopment
The question of why has there been such success in East Asia and why has there been
such failure in sub-Saharan Africa has many dimensions. One of the most important
is the issue of civil strife, which has plagued much of the region for the last thirty
years. An example lies in the contrast between Botswana and Sierra Leone. Botswana
and Sierra Leone are both rich in diamonds, but in Botswana, diamonds have been
used to raise standards of living; in Sierra Leone they have been the source of civil
strife and its people have become worse off.
Indeed of the ten poorest
countries of the world, six have
suffered civil war in recent years.
Civil wars are a major contributor
to poverty. In 1999, in contrast to
two international conflicts there
were 25 civil conflicts around the
world, a staggering number.
Without wishing to sound inhumane, for economists the large number of civil
conflicts does have one major advantage: we can study the causes of strife. The
terrible suffering does at least give us a rich enough data set that we can try to
understand which factors cause strife and which extend strife’s duration. The result
has been the beginning of work, particularly at the World Bank, trying to identify
these factors.
Here I address several of the more important factors, particularly from a
theoretical perspective.1 There is a two-way relationship between civil strife and
economics. I referred to the fact that civil strife leads to poverty, but it is also true that
poverty and economic stagnation are a major cause of civil strife. This fact was
brought home forcefully in the case of Indonesia where the 1997 East Asian currency
crisis resulted in a dramatic fall in incomes and a dramatic increase in unemployment.
In developed economies we talk about an economic downturn in terms of, say, a two
percent decrease in GDP. But in Indonesia, the fall in GDP was 16 percent, and real
wages of many of the poorest workers went down by 25 to 30 percent.
Unemployment increased ten-fold. In the middle of this process – falling GDP,
falling real wages, rising unemployment – and under the influence of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), food and fuel subsidies were cut for the poor.
The consequence, one the IMF was warned of five months previously, was perfectly
predictable: riots broke out and further weakened the economy. Had the IMF pursued
a less contractionary policy, it could have avoided the civil strife. Had it avoided the
civil strife, it could have minimized the magnitude of the downturn the people faced.
Imperfect information: an analogy between strife and strike
Strife can be seen as an extreme form of breakdown of society and its economy. In
many ways it is like a conflict between employer and employees, a strike. One would
think that rational people could resolve their disputes in ways that do not lead to
massive misallocations of resources. But what happens in a strike is an unnecessary
idleness of both labor and machines, so that the strike represents a breakdown in
industrial relations. The employer believes that the worker cannot manage to survive
without wages, and the worker believes that the firm will not be able to survive the
loss of profits from the strike. The prospect of a strike and corresponding lock-out is
a mutual threat to impose harm in the hope that one side or the other will give in and
a resolution of the impasse will occur.
Theorists spend a lot of time trying to understand why strikes, which seem so
inefficient, occur. After all, at the end of the strike there is a resolution: people go
back to work, production resumes, wages and profits are restored. Why not skip the
intervening period in which resources are inefficiently used? One theoretical
approach to this problem is the idea of bargaining under incomplete information. An
aspect of such bargaining is that each side tries verbally to convey information to the
other, but because “talk is cheap” the information can only really be conveyed
through costly mechanisms. The workers say, “We care so much about this issue that
we’re willing to pay a price.” The employers likewise say, “We care so much about
this that we’re willing to pay a price.” It is because of the sacrifices that each side
makes that the communication, costly as it is, actually takes place.
Civil strife is like a strike: when the two sides in the process cannot reach an
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agreement, there is an impasse. In the end there is a resolution, but before the
resolution occurs there is strife, and that strife is costly not only to the people
involved, but painfully costly to others in society. Conflicts are often based on a
basic, initial misjudgment: each side believes it can win. Obviously, if they had
rational expectations, each would realize it is not possible for both sides to win, and
that the net gain they obtain after the strike is less than they could have got if they had
settled before the strike. One of the characteristics of conflicts is they are based on
a fundamental misjudgment about the relative positions of the two sides. These
imperfections of information lie at the core of much civil strife.
Some causes of civil strife
Apart from imperfect information, which other factors help determine the benefits
and cost of cooperation versus the benefits and cost and conflict? One factor, and this
is true both theoretically and empirically, is whether the economy is essentially a rent
economy or an economy involved in real productive activity. A rent economy is an
economy like Angola’s, dominated by diamonds and oil, where people basically are
sitting on a pile of money and little real production is occurring.2 The Angolan
economy does not add value to these commodities through processing or
manufacturing. The question is who is going to get what share of the pile of money;
how will the pie be divided?
One way of thinking about dividing the pie of a natural resource-based economy
is as a zero-sum game: the more I get the less you get. This almost naturally leads to
conflict. Another useful analogy might come from a child’s view of parental love.
Two or three siblings compete fiercely for their parents’ attention on the view that
there is a fixed amount of attention. If one gets more, the other has to get less. Of
course, this need not be true in reality. But if the perception is that there is a fixed
size of the pie, the only issue that is at stake is how you divide the pie. Thus, conflict
is very likely to occur.
I suggest that one reason
conflict is so frequent in Africa is
that many of its economies have for
so long been rent-based. They have
not been based on manufacturing,
they have not been based on
investment, they have not been
based on a growing pie. Instead,
they have been based on taking
resources out of the ground and
dividing the spoils among the contestants.
The notion of endemic conflict in rent economies can be contrasted with what
happens in an investment economy. In an investment economy, a manufacture and
service-based economy, what happens if civil strife occurs? Investment stops.
Nobody wants to invest in an economy in which conflict destroys one’s capital.
Everybody sees large potential losses looming and that there will be nothing to divide
once fighting starts. The cost of strife is enormous, and the benefits of continued
cooperation are huge also. This contrast illustrates forcefully why civil strife is so
common in Africa and so much less common in other parts of the world. In Africa
the individual contestant sees huge benefits from seizing as much of the fixed-size
pie as he can, but little cost because investment is already low.
A second factor affecting the
existence of strife is whether
individuals feel they have much to
lose by engaging in strife. There are
two aspects to this: income and
mobility. Low-income people, already at subsistence level, have relatively little to
lose from conflict. In a low-mobility society there is not much to lose from conflict
either, because if local wages are low people cannot do any better elsewhere. And in
much of Africa both income and mobility are low. Engaging in conflict, therefore,
is cheap. Opportunity costs are low, and low income and mobility contribute to the
existence of strife.
To bring home this point, consider that a number of people believe that ethnic
fractionation is an important contributor to strife, and it does play a role. But the
degree of ethnic fractionation in some European countries, for instance Belgium, is
not all that different from that of many African countries. What differentiates the two
situations is the level of income and mobility and given strata of the ethnic
fractionation.
A third factor is whether the economy functions as an one-round game or as a
repeated game. If society is already dissolving, the kinds of things that ordinarily glue
people together – repeated interactions in the market, shared customs, and the
expectations and trust built thereon – are weakened. Interactions become “one-offs.”
Consequently, the incentives for conflict are increased, as is the cost of cooperation.
Finally, a fourth and crucial factor has to do with voice and disenfranchisement.
If there is a group within society that believes its voice is not heard, that its concerns
are not or will not be reflected in the collective decisions made by society, that group
has little to lose by conflict and is therefore more likely to engage in it.
Let me emphasize that what is of relevance is not just the reality of these various
factors but also peoples’ perceptions of them. Consider the Indonesian crisis of the
late 1990s: the fact that Indonesia experienced ethnic strife thirty years earlier
contributed to its sense of continued insecurity. Had it not had that experience it
might have been possible to avoid the strife in the most recent episode. In short,
history matters.
One reason conflict is so frequent in
Africa is that many of its economies
have for so long been rent-based. They
have not been based on
manufacturing, they have not been
based on investment. The pie to be
divided does not grow.
Low income and low mobility
contribute to the existence of strife.
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Political and social implications
I have outlined why strife is
important, the relationship between
strife and economics, how we can
think about strife as a phenomenon,
and what are some of the factors
that affect strife. Now I address
some of the policy and broader
social implications of these ideas.
There are six I want to draw attention to. The first, as mentioned above, is that history
matters and cannot be undone. Certain policies were adopted in Indonesia that led to
the civil strife of 1998. Indonesians cannot say, as the IMF did right after the riots
broke out: “Oh, we made a mistake. We will put the subsidies back into place. We
didn’t really need to abolish those subsidies. That was wrong.” Unfortunately, there
is a time-line to history. When one restores the subsidies, one does not thereby undo
the damage. The resulting ethnic strife and civil disharmony is now part of the reality
that the people of Indonesia will have to deal with for decades to come. The story of
Indonesia contains an important message for makers of economic policy: think very
hard about policies that might cause strife because if you do engage in those policies,
it may be difficult to reverse the consequences. The Indonesian example urges
extreme caution in policies that carry those potential effects.
Second, I wish to address the topic of democracy and strife. I referred before to
the role of disenfranchisement. When people feel that their voice is not being heard,
they are more likely to engage in strife. Sometimes people believe that “Democracy
is all we need.” Democracy, in its simplest version, means going to the ballot box and
making sure that the majority rules. But being able to cast a ballot is not enough to
avoid civil strife. With voting it is possible to arrive at a democratically legitimized
tyranny of the majority over a minority. A democracy may wind up, in spite of
voting, with strife. We have seen a number of instances of that kind. The ballot box
does not guarantee that all groups can be heard.
Many societies in which government does not use the ballot box are very well
attuned to this point. Many of us prefer democracy, of course; I certainly do myself.
But it is nonetheless true that in countries where people do not go to the ballot box,
leaders have to look for other forms of legitimization, and those other forms of
legitimization entail, in part, ensuring that all groups’ voices are heard. Ironically, in
some countries in which the ballot box is not used, there is more sensitivity to
ensuring that the voices of minorities are heard.
This assurance can be derived through a variety of mechanisms. In many
countries the recognition of the possibility of the “tyranny of the majority” has led
to explicit introduction of restrictions on what the majority (through a duly elected
government) can do. In the United States, for example, there is the Bill of Rights. The
Bill of Rights – freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, even
privacy rights – are rights that a majority of voters cannot remove from the minority
of voters.
Ethiopia uses a different mechanism. Its recently adopted constitution gives any
region the right to withdraw from the country. Now why would the framers do that,
if they did not intend to have the country break apart? By giving the right to each
region to withdraw, Ethiopia ensures that the central government pays attention to the
concerns of the regions. For the last decade this framework has been working fairly
effectively and is an interesting experiment in ensuring voice.
Empirically, it appears that societies with a high degree of ethnic fractionation
enjoy greater stability than countries in which there is little, and particularly more
than those countries which have only two main groups. With large numbers of groups
one sees shifting alliances which minimize the opportunities for one group to
dominate another. A variety of possible alliances lead to greater stability. I want to
emphasize that for democracy to really be effective, and to generate a sense of
enfranchisement to avoid civil strife, one has to engage in meaningful processes that
include consensus building and sharing of information. Several countries have
instituted these kinds of processes and as a result have achieved a higher degree of
stability.
The third point that I want to emphasize is that it is not just equality that matters,
but mobility as well. The perceived option of upward mobility, the sense of having
a chance to do better, is very important in maintaining social stability. The fourth
point is that economic growth matters. The kind of policies that led to stagnation and
decline, as we have seen in Indonesia, entail a downward spiral effect. As growth
declines social cohesion declines and that leads to more strife which, in turn, leads
to further decline.
My fifth point relates to efforts to expand the scope of cooperation among
society’s members. There are essentially two ways through which cooperation can
be expanded. One is through legal systems in which one coerces people to behave
cooperatively, if necessary by threat of force (the “law and order” function of police
forces). The other way is through the use of incentives or rewards, to convince people
that it is in their interest to cooperate and avoid strife. The problem facing much of
sub-Saharan Africa is that its states are so weak that one of the basic functions of the
state – to enforce cooperative behavior by policing – is missing. Regrettably, a
system of incentives for cooperation is also missing. Both the guarantees of
cooperation, the carrots and the sticks, are missing, and as a result the incidence of
strife is high.
The sixth and final point regards the importance of trying to create a sense of
national identity, i.e., the forging of social capital, and the role of social capital in
bringing people into cooperative action. In the theory of economic organization, we
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1. Paul Collier, in this issue, summarizes some of the available empirical findings.
2. For the story of Angola, see Manuel Ennes Ferreira’s article in this issue. Also see
David Gold’s article, in this issue, on conflict diamonds.
talk about how one gets people to act cooperatively. One way is to provide
incentives, but incentives can be very difficult to provide.
An alternative way is to change peoples’ beliefs and perceptions and try to get
them to identify with the organization. In economics today we often make use of the
concept of “social capital” through which people gain a sense that they belong to a
common society. An unfortunate example of the destruction of social capital comes
from Russia. The last decade in Russia has been dismal: output has declined by 50
percent, and the population has gone from two percent in poverty to 50. One of the
most convincing explanations proffered has to do with the destruction of social
capital that coincided with the rapid shift to a privatized, market economy.
Several countries have tried deliberately to create a strong sense of social capital
by making people have an explicit notion of a social contract, an explicit attention to
social justice, much more awareness of a common history, common language, and
common culture. On the whole, societies in Asia are much less riven by strife than
societies in Africa and some economists ascribe this in part to a greater stock of
social capital.
Conclusion
Civil strife and the implications for economic and social policy illustrates how
economics is becoming redefined. It is becoming redefined both in the questions that
we ask and the tools that we use to answer those questions. But in trying to
understand society and even its economic behavior, we have to go beyond the narrow
confines of traditional economics. I believe that economics is an important tool for
understanding how we can help create a better society and lessen civil strife. Trying
to understand the factors that have contributed to civil strife, trying to design policies
that will avoid the likelihood of civil strife is essential because, as mentioned at the
outset, civil strife is one of the most important factors that is impeding economic
growth in sub-Saharan Africa and much of the rest of the world and has led to so
much poverty in so many countries around the world. Unless we address the factors
contributing to civil strife, we cannot hope to have these countries share in the
potential benefits that can come from the process of globalization that has become so
central to the world today.
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